Saturday, November 10, 2012

On Beyond Holcombe: United States Pharmacal Company

On Beyond Holcombe, by Malcolm A. Goldstein, appears on Sundays at 1898 Revenues.



As Monty Python would say: “and now for something completely different.”  One immediate apparent difference is that the impetus for this article about the United States Pharmacal Co (USPCo) arises from a documentary battleship stamp cancel, one found on a company check, rather than a proprietary battleship cancel.  Not that USPCo proprietary cancels do not exist.  Mustacich and Giacomelli identify several different ones that the company employed, including both printed and hand-stamped, and one of the printed varieties is also illustrated here.  The company obviously had a sufficient volume of business to warrant use of enough stamps to cause the different cancels, although its name is now principally identified with IXL Hair Restorer and New Century Scalp Tonic.




However, the real point of distinction between USPCo and the other manufacturers previously discussed in this column is in its ownership.  The success of the proprietary medicine companies heretofore examined has largely been driven by the aspirations of some shrewd businessperson/huckster (ala Radam) who, having fixated on the idea that his or her elixir would vanquish disease, strove to convert that vision into a fortune.  USPCo was born of a more practical goal: to build the fortunes, not of the creators, but rather the ultimate sellers of those nostrums to the public.  The Illinois Pharmaceutical Association (IPA), an association of retail druggists, authorized the formation of the company in a resolution passed at its meeting held in Peoria, IL, in July, 1894.  IPA’s idea was to create a “mutual or cooperative manufacturing pharmaceutical company owned, operated and controlled directly by retail druggists.”  By organizing and owning their own pharmaceutical supply source, the IPA’s members hoped to attain perfect retail price control maintenance for their products. Establishing a single set of prices would guarantee a larger profit margin to the retailer by conserving a larger percentage of the consumer’s fixed final cost to the retailer.  After all, money not owned to the manufacturers or the wholesalers for the basic cost of their products was money in the retailers’ pockets.  However, because of the large number of nostrums and patent  medicines potentially available, and the need for continuous, heavy barrage of advertising then thought necessary to keep any brand fixed in the public’s mind - normally a cost borne by the manufacturer of the product  - cooperatives were formed only by a distinct minority of retailers.

USPCo was one of the most long-lived and successful of these retail owned cooperatives. The method that IPA devised for the operation of USPCo was as harsh and restrictive as any devised by the manufacturers and the wholesalers themselves, for the IPA adopted a price control plan (IPA Plan) called the Direct Contract and Serial Number plan (DCSN plan). IPA even prided itself on being the organization that introduced this particular scheme to the United States. If IPA was, indeed, the first to adopt it, the DCSN plan was quickly and widely copied thereafter by manufacturers and retailers themselves.  A DCSN Plan provided that the manufacturer signed an individual contract with each retailer to supply product already priced for retail sale that also bore a unique serial number traceable to the individual retailer.  If the manufacturer’s product was purchased thereafter at any price other than the printed price or from anyone other than the retailer to whom the serial number had been allocated, the leak in the closed system could be traced immediately by consulting the manufacturer’s master list of serial numbers.  The manufacturer enforced its plan by issuing periodic “cut-lists,” usually monthly, of those retailers who had undersold the marked price or who had let product stray from their stock (such that it was ultimately vended by someone else for less than the marked price), and these offending retailers were barred from further purchases of goods from any member of the plan, until they pledged again to uphold the plan.



Because of USPCo’s success, its representatives were given a place of honor among the speakers at one of the sessions attendant to the Convention held in St. Louis in 1904 by the National Association of Retail Druggists (NARD) to explain the IPA Plan’s workings to all of the assembled retailers.  The IPA Plan operated so well that IPA celebrated its tenth anniversary of actual operation in 1906 with special resolutions asking each retail member to institute a special advertising promotion called “U S P Co week” during the first weeks of September, December, March and June of that year, and each subsequent year, where member pharmacists would “give the goods of the U. S. Pharmacal Co. special advertising, special display in their stores, special window space, and in other ways extra and unusual prominence, with a view to increasing the sales on their goods.”  Shortly after the passage of these resolution, the NARD’s Notes trade circular reported that the September, 1906 “U S P Co” week was extremely successful.  On the very same page, the circular published a complete list of all those companies and organizations that had adopted DCSN plans.  It summarized the then successful current state of affairs created by DCSN plans by saying: “The preparations of these manufacturers, protected as they are by direct contract and serial numbering identification marks, are being successfully kept out of the hands of mail order houses and other price demoralization agencies by their respective makers and retail profits on the sale thereof are being maintained on a healthy basis.”

The only potential shadow on USPCo’s future was the possibility that the legality of DCSN plans might successfully be challenged in the courts. For twenty years those “mail order houses and other price demoralization agencies,” whose names regularly appeared on the monthly “cut-lists” of DCSN plans kept arguing that these DCSN plans were an illegal restraint of trade.  They continually sued, asking the courts to “specifically compel” by injunction the sponsors of DCSN plans to sell to them on the same basis as plan members. These excluded wholesalers and retailers insisted that DCSN plans prevented competition because they could not freely sell the products protected under these plans (no matter how they acquired them) for less than the sponsors’ required retail prices, even though they were satisfied to receive from their sales a smaller profit margin than plan members.




This line of reasoning consistently puzzled the state courts to whom it was argued.  At their most friendly, courts are always reluctant to issue orders compelling parties to do specific acts - so-called “mandatory” injunctions - because they are accustomed to remedying harm by awarding sums of money as damages, figuring that such monetary damage awards compensate for actions not performed.  Courts issue injunctions only where circumstances are irreversible. For example, if there were questions surrounding ownership of a historic house, and the house was about to be torn down, a court might enjoin the demolition, pending a full review of the circumstances, on the theory that the house, once demolished, cannot be reassembled, and so is “irreparable.”  Even this kind of injunction is not “mandatory” but “preventative,” preserving the house intact only until the disputed issue is resolved. A mandatory injunction compels an unwilling party to act when it would otherwise not act.   Courts could never find such “irreparable” harm in the exclusion of “cut-listed” retailers by sponsors of DCSN’s plans.  Citing defendant manufacturers’ “liberty” to sell only to those with whom they chose to do business, and treating the plaintiff wholesalers and retailers as interlopers who had somehow unfairly meddled with the harmony of the DCSN plans by procuring the protected products under shady circumstances, the courts fairly consistently upheld the legality of DCSN plans, endorsing them as legitimate business models. 

However, with the advent of President Theodore Roosevelt’s attempts to control the overreaching of manufacturing trusts of all stripes by having the US Justice Department enforce the federal Sherman Act, the legality of DCSN plans began to come under attack.  Building on success in earlier antitrust suits brought against other industries, in May, 1907, the federal government achieved in the drug industry the “Indianapolis Decree,” the settlement of an Sherman Act antitrust suit against the Proprietary Association of America representing manufacturers, the National Wholesale Drug Association representing the wholesale druggists, and the NARD representing retailers (as well as specifically named companies, such as Gilbert Bros & Co, previously mentioned in an earlier column), which began to erode the control manufacturers could exercise on retail prices through DCSN plans.  Nevertheless, within months after this settlement was negotiated an article in the Pacific Pharmacist, a new drug trade journal, flatly asserted: “The D.C. and S.N. plan is not affected [by the settlement], provided the manufacturer will put the plan into effect individually, and not “in collusion” with other manufacturers, or any other agency or agencies” (italics in original).



This viewpoint proved to be wishful thinking.  Focusing upon the result that consumers were forced to buy at the single price set in retail price maintenance plans, which it found to be maintained artificially higher than it otherwise would have been had the cut-rate retailers sold at the price they chose (rather than adhering to the state court rulings favoring the “liberty” of manufacturers to sell only to those whom they liked), in 1911, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled retail price maintenance plans, such as the DCSN plan, illegal restraints upon trade pursuant to the provisions of the Sherman Act. (Since analyzing the nuances of all the cases which led to the 1911 decision, both pro and con, is extremely complex, the various court decisions will be examined in greater detail as this column visits the specific companies involved in them).

The IPA Plan itself was never ruled illegal in a specific court decision, and it is unclear when USPCo finally discarded it, although presumably it was shortly after the Supreme Court’s ruling in 1911. Other questions not answered in the extant records are when or whether IPA’s members ever separated themselves from ownership of USPCO, and exactly when USPCo manufactured the IXL Hair Restorer and New Century Scalp Tonic.  USPCo was still listed in trade indexes as late as 1927 as a Chicago based manufacturer of household patent medicines, and these products probably date from the teens or the twenties. Whether this company actually still exists cannot be proven from the extant records.  The name, however, has continued to exist.

At some date after 1927, the USPCo name appears to have unmoored from the IPA and the Chicago location. In 1940, a company with the USPCo name was to be located in Newark, NJ.  In 1942, the federal government seized as misbranded a shipment of citrate of magnesia, a patent medicine staple, manufactured by the USPCo in Newark, NJ and released it to a Philadelphia company for re-branding.  In 1959, a USPCo registered its ownership of the trademark Syr-Tane for use on cough syrup. In 1963 USPCo showed up in a drug trade listing as a corporation located in Brooklyn, NY.  In a 1976 trade compilation, the USPCo name was associated with a product called Ban-Itch (a product name which was later itself associated with Sheffield Laboratories, the successor to another company that cancelled battleship proprietary stamps - but that is a story for another day).  In 1980, a USPCo is listed as a division of another pharmaceutical company, and in 1988, the Syr-Tane trademark expired without being renewed.  A website named Bizapedia lists the United States Pharmacal Co name as “active” as of January 3, 2012, in connection with a address listed broadly as Philadelphia, PA and taken from a filing made in Pennsylvania in 1958.   Another website, Manta, shows that a United States Pharmacal Co, LLC, incorporated in Colorado in 2005, is located in Erie, CO, just outside of Boulder, CO.  This USPCo presently maintains its own website and advertises a product called Cann-Ease Nasal Moisterizing Gel on several websites.  Yet another website, Cotera, shows the USPCo as a testing laboratory incorporated in 2003 and headquartered Lafayette, CO, next door to Erie, CO. Although the Colorado company has no direct connection to the namesake Chicago company, its own website continues the tradition of building its sales upon testimonials from satisfied customers, now posted on line instead of reproduced in print ads.  The spirit of over-the-counter cures soldiers on.

Wednesday, November 7, 2012

First National Bank, Charlotte, Michigan



FIRST NATIONAL BANK
MAR
28
1900
CHARLOTTE, MICH.

Langlois scan



The hazards of living and working in the Michigan logging business, even for a white-collared owner and banker, are made clear by this story from the Fulton, Michigan Patriot.  First National Bank President William Smith came to a rather gruesome end in 1889:

Fulton Patriot, Sep 26, 1889

Bank President Killed

Charlotte, Mich., Sept 25 - President William Smith of the First National Bank of this city, was killed at Wolverine by being thrown from a log carrier against a moving saw. Mr. Smith held vast lumber interests in Cheboygan county and went to that point to make general arrangements for the transfer of the property to a Chicago man, who was with Mr. Smith at the time of the accident. Besides controlling the stock of the First National bank he was rated as one of the richest men in the county.

Tuesday, November 6, 2012

Denver Fire Clay Company

The identity of this cancel is based on an educated guess and needs a confirmatory on-document example.  If you have a D. F. C. Co. cancel on-piece, please write to me at 1898revenues@gmail.com.



D. F. C. CO.
APR  7    1899
DENVER

Langlois scan


The Denver Fire Clay Company had its origins in a drugstore owned and operated by Joab Otis Bosworth at 411 Larimer St. in Denver.  The year was 1876 and Bosworth had already began experimenting with fire clay hoping to develop assay products including scorifiers, crucibles and muffles to compete with those being imported from Europe. The assay business was booming and Bosworth quickly created a product line.  He formed a partnership known as Bosworth, Babcock & Co and began supplying Colorado assayers with a variety of products including chemicals, mining equipment and supplies, and clay crucibles under the name Denver Fire Clay.

In 1878, Bosworth enlisted William Hover, an assayer from Salt Lake City, to become a business partner in the drugstore and Bosworth devoted full time to the fire clay business. The Denver Fire Clay Co. at 31st and Blake Streets was incorporated in 1880 with a capital stock of $20,000. Bosworth was elected President, F. M. Case, Secretary, George Snyder, Jr., Assistant Secretary, and A. E. Smith, Plant Foreman. Much of DFC’s early production was of fire-resistant bricks for the construction of smelters. In 1890, Bosworth was killed in an explosion at the DFC store on Larimer St. and his widow continued the business constructing a new downtown building to house the retail store at 1742 Champa Street.

*****

Monday, November 5, 2012

Election Day 2012 -- New York Stock Brokers: Wardwell & Adams and Election Returns

New York Times classified, Feb 12, 1901



WARDWELL & ADAMS,
APR  8 -  1901
NEW YORK

Langlois scan


Wardwell & Adams, among other Wall Street firms, stayed open late on election nights as they had their own telegraph wires for the conduct of business which allowed for nearly instant reporting of returns as they were available in Washington.  Presumably their better customers were given access to their offices after hours.  From The New York Times, November 6, 1910:


Sunday, November 4, 2012

Tracking Values: RB27 2 Cent Battleship Proprietary

Over the weekend, I was contacted by a reader of this site located in Tokyo Japan regarding my interest in, and the potential value of, multiples of the 2ct proprietary battleship revenue stamp.  This is a good opportunity to look at the current and commonly listed values for this stamp, in single, multiple, unused, and used form.

As with all stamps in the battleship revenue series, there is nothing especially rare or valuable about this stamp.  Let's take a look at current values:



R164 2ct Battleship Documentary rouletted and RB27 2ct Battleship Proprietary rouletted

As many readers of this site know, there are two 2ct battleship stamps, one from the documentary series and  another for the proprietary series.  The documentary 2 cent stamp was largely used to pay the 2ct tax on bank checks, and the majority of used 2ct documentaries were used this way.  100s of millions of the documentary stamp were printed, and in both used an unused form the stamp is fairly common.  The 2ct proprietary is a bit different, as far fewer were printed and used.  

Demand for the proprietary 2 center was a small fraction of that for the documentary stamp.  Normal patent medicine items did not have an accompanying tax schedule that required the use of a 2 cent stamp, so the famous patent medicine or "snake oil" preparations of the day did not use this stamp.  There were designated uses, though, including the taxation of chewing gum (chicle was a recent discovery at the time of use of this stamp) and taxable wines, in particular sparkling wines like champagne.  On this site you can find many copies of this stamp canceled by Mumm, the champagne maker, by clicking on the Mumm stamp in the far right column (scroll down a bit to find the stamp).

Perforation types:  two types of separation schemes were used on the battleship stamps, and the 2ct proprietary included both.  The stamp above is an example of rouletting, in which a roulette wheel, or a wheel consisting of short razor blades, cuts a series of staccato lines in the sheet.  No paper was removed from the stamp sheet in process.  Hyphen-hole perforating, however, does remove paper, and cuts a series of slots in between the stamps.  The plate block below contains very clear and evident hyphen hole perforations.  This distinction is important, as the value of many stamps in the battleship series varies greatly depending on whether the stamp is rouletted or hyphen-holed.  

Values:

2012 Scott US Specialized Catalogue:


                                                  unused                 used
Rouletted single                          1.40                     .35
Roultted block of four                6.75                      no value

Hyphen hole single                      7.25                     1.00
Hyphen hole block of four          27.50                    no value

In the case of the reader from Tokyo, his unused hyphen holed strips, assuming the gum on the back of the stamps is intact and undamaged, can value his stamps at retail by multiplying $7.25 times the number of stamps he has.  One minor tragedy associated with his stamps are that they were once in block form, and had the selvage with plate number attached.  As with all the battleship revenue stamps, intact complete plate blocks are scarce, and the 2ct proprietary is no exception:


2ct battleship proprietary plate block, hyphen hole
Current EricJackson.com price: $650.00

Not shown:
2ct battleship proprietary plate block, rouletted
Current EricJackson.com price: $450.00

On Beyond Holcombe: Dr. Taft Brothers Medicine Company


On Beyond Holcombe, by Malcolm A. Goldstein, appears Sundays at 1898 Revenues:






The Drs Taft, who owned the Dr Taft Bros Medicine Company, based their patent medicine business in the upstate, western New York city of Rochester.  The company’s principal product  was Asthmalene, which was meant to cure asthma, hay fever and other bronchial disorders, but the it also sold Sure Relief, Balm of Gilead and other remedies. One of its principal boosters was the Rev. Dr. Morris Wechsler, rabbi of Congregation Bnai Israel in New York City.  His testimonial letter is featured second only to a minister’s in virtually all of the Asthmalene ads the company ever ran, and he vouches that “after having it carefully analyzed, we can state that Asthmalene contains no opium, morphine, chloroform or ether.”  No information is provided as to how or why the company chose a rabbi as so prominent  a proponent, nor under what circumstances, the rabbi had the product analyzed before endorsing it.  Note also that alcohol is not included in the list of excluded substances.  Perhaps the rabbi was a closet tippler.
 

 
 
The Taft brothers were Albert S and Gilbert T.  They  were children of Lewis and Sarah (Brown) Taft, born in Windon [Windham?], VT, Albert in 1824 and Gilbert in 1826.  Albert later moved to Bristol, NY, just south of Rochester, to study medicine with a Dr. Daniel Durgan. There is strong evidence to suggest that in 1866, Gilbert, also a physician, was selling Rosenberger’s German Magnetic Oil and Balm of Gilead at Seneca Falls, NY, another small town southeast of Rochester,  under the name of G T Taft & Co.  After they apparently purchased the Rosenberger brands and renamed them, both he and Albert settled in Rochester in 1868, where they formed their medicine company in joint name.  Gilbert died in 1885 and his body was solemnly transported from Rochester to Auburn, NY, as the local paper noted, with all the accompanying honors of a high degree mason, to be buried near his in-laws.  In 1885, the name of Dr Henry D. Taft, Gilbert and Albert’s younger brother, was also associated with the company, but Henry died in 1890 at age 57.  For all of its Western New York connections, by 1890 the company had a Canadian office, and, in 1892, an ad for Asthmalene appeared in the local paper in North Otago, New Zealand!  By 1899, the company had incorporated with Albert as president.  That year, its annual report showed capitalization of $50,000, all in issued stock,  assets of $3,171.31 and debts of $400. Albert continued to hold the title of president until his sudden death in 1900. 
 
Almost immediately after Albert’s death, the company moved its offices from Rochester to New York City.  Control of the corporation appears to have passed to Gilbert’s son, William B. Taft,  and he must have engendered this sudden transition. In 1901, from its newly acquired New York City address, the company authorized placement of its ad for Asthmalene featuring the minister, the Rev Dr Wechsler, and a few more stalwarts, in publications as varied as the International Railway Journal, the Yale University literary magazine, the Rosary (the magazine of the Dominicans), the Coopers [barrel makers] Journal, and the Menorah (the magazine of the Jewish Chautauqua Society), among others.




 
In 1905, Asthmalene was re-registered as a trademark, now of the Taft’s Asthmalene Company of New York City, and, by 1909, the name of one B S McKean  “as sole agent,” located at the same New York City address as Taft’s company,  replaced its name on the Asthmalene box and wrapper.  While the younger Taft still owned both the company and the product’s  name in the banner on the box, he must have decided to interpose McKean’s name between himself and the increasingly more wary public.
 
Bernard Slagle McKean (1863-1914) seems to have been a character in his own right, and to have traveled in fast circles, beyond the patent medicine industry.  He was an attorney, who, in 1900, issued a circular to a large number of companies alleging that they were paying their corporate taxes incorrectly based upon his study of the tax returns they had filed with the State Controller.  After a number of companies grumbled loudly and angrily about how and why the Controller was permitting someone to study their confidential tax returns, and the Controller had denied that any such review had taken place, a New York Times reporter tracked McKean down at the local Republican club where he cooly asserted that his opinion was based purely on the State Controller’s public reports and his letter was merely a offer to save them money by correcting the returns.  In 1898, he had acted as receiver of the assets of the huge, failed United Life Assurance Company, whose members included some of New York City’s most important people, including Mayor Van Wyck and Teddy Roosevelt’s successor as police commissioner. In 1904, his office - at the same address as the Taft company - was the venue for several meetings with witnesses and press conferences held in connection with one of the most sensational shootings of that year (or, perhaps, of any year, prior to Harry Thaw’s 1906 shooting of the architect Sanford White in the rooftop restaurant at his own Madison Square Garden building over the showgirl Evelyn Nesbit Thaw - the timeless beauty immortalized as the “girl on the velvet swing,” - the entire story of which is unfolded again in the pages of E L Doctorow’s book Ragtime). 
 

 
 
McKean was involved in the Patterson matter because it was his brother-in-law, Francis “Caesar” Young, a notorious gambler and bookie, who was punctured by a fatal pistol bullet while riding in a cab on his way to board the S.S. Germanic bound for Europe with his wife.  Almost as great as the public’s frisson at Young’s abrupt demise, was its surprise at the identity of the person in the cab with him, the “Floradora” actresses Nan Patterson, with whom, it was revealed, he had been carrying on a torrid clandestine affair for two years.  Ms. Patterson was arrested and indicted for murder, but claimed Young shot himself because he was distraught over the prospect of parting from her.  Despite strong evidence that Ms. Patterson had brought the pistol to the rendezvous (although it was recovered from the dead man’s pocket!), after two trials and two hung juries, Patterson was finally released in 1905 despite the District Attorney’s howls that the press had whitewashed the beautiful young woman’s case in the newspapers.  One modern writer has even speculated that Ms. Patterson’s story was so flimsy that Sherlock Holmes must have assisted the defense team during his absence from England after disappearing at Reichenbach Falls while fighting with Moriarty. 

McKean was not entirely unacquainted with nostrums even before his stewardship of the Taft company.  He had been a founding director of the American Carlsbad Mineral Sprudel Bath Company of New York in 1894, a mineral water concern.  This industry gradually must have drawn more of his attention, and by 1909 he was the “sole agent” of Taft’s Asthmalene. When, in 1913, a doctor in Florida sought guidance from a medical publication as to the bona fides of Asthmalene, that publication forwarded the inquiry to the “Propaganda for Reform” Department of the Journal of the American Medical Association, then in full tilt as this country’s primary chasers and exposers of quack medicine.  The doctors there conducted laboratory tests on patent medicines, published their findings in the Journal of the AMA and passed the results on to the fledgling federal FDA. The department answered that while it had not fully analyzed the compound, so long as McKean’s label disclosed its alcohol content (10%), and the modified language on the box did not guarantee sure cures, it was “the old story of a ‘lie direct’ being replaced with the ‘lie with circumstances’.” It concluded that since the labeling did not violate current regulations, the reformers could do nothing to bar Asthmalene’s sale, no matter how ineffectual the concoction otherwise might be.  In fact, no formal denunciation of the product ever appeared in the AMA’s Nostrums and Quackery, the 25 year, three volume compilation of the articles on dangerous patent medicines that the “Propaganda for Reform” Department published between 1911 and 1936. While the third and last volume leads with a section reproducing the articles exposing the misleading asthma and hay fever cures identified between 1921 and 1936, Asthmalene ultimately escaped the AMA’s rigorous scrutiny.  That alcohol was a major ingredient of Asthmalene and the company’s other advertised medicinal preparations cannot be doubted, for in 1913 the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury authorized the Customs Collector in New York to make a routine refund of import duty to the company in connection with the export of its medicines, up to the amount of tax previously paid by the company on the imported alcohol now contained in its medicine.  In 1916, the Dr Taft Bros Medicine Co was still listed in the Druggist’s Index as a patent medicine manufacturer.  Soon, thereafter, the Asthmalene wrapper showed the manufacturer as the B S McKean Co of Mamaroneck, New York. In 1941, that company was still advertising Asthmalene, and tracing its founding to 1868. In 1946 that McKean company “re-renewed” the 1906 Asthmalene trademark in its own name. However, by that time, that company was also registering trademarks other than Dr Taft’s and Asthmalene to advertise its products, and the Taft name eventually faded away.  Asthmalene now lists as an “expired” trademark.

Thursday, November 1, 2012

Eureka Springs Railroad

For several years I have been studying the cancels in the 2c battleship calendar that is linked on this site (see the right side column and scroll down).  One stamp has a set of four question marks immediately below it, presumably put there by Henry Tolman.  For years I've had the same set of question marks in my head about this cancel.  But recently, and quite literally, I had a eureka moment, and saw very clearly that this stamp was of course canceled by the Eureka Springs Railway.



EUREKA SPRINGS RY. CO.
W. XXXXS
SEP
28
1898
CASHR. & AUD.
EUREKA SPRINGS, ARK.

some of the above is suppositional
Langlois scan



From the City of Eureka Springs website:

"The Eureka Improvement Company can be credited with at least two major contributions to the development of the town as a popular resort. The first was funding and constructing the Eureka Springs Railroad. In 1880 the nearest railroad terminal was the St. Louis and San Francisco Railroad depot in Pierce City, Missouri, 55 miles from Eureka Springs. The people coming to the springs had to depend on a nine hour coach ride from Pierce City to complete the trip. The following year the railroad line reached Seligman, Missouri, only 20 miles from the resort area. Seeing the need for a railroad line into Eureka Springs, the Eureka Improvement Company began promoting and planning for what became the Eureka Springs Railroad. Completed in 1882, the railroad brought great prosperity to the town not only in the health trade but in the commercial industry as well. The railroad terminal was the nearest depot for the isolated counties to the east and southeast. Therefore, Eureka Springs became an important commercial center for the area. Another benefit, in connection with the railroad was the establishment of a St. Louis and San Francisco Railroad shop. The benefits of the railroad and its running of as many as six trains a day seemed to assure the future economic success of the town."



1886 ES RY timetable showing times and station stops from Seligman, Arkansas to Eureka Springs.  Seligman Arkansas was named after Joseph Seligman, scion of the Seligman banking family and the banker of Jay Gould, a baron of railroads in the US southwest.  Seligman interests would make heavy use of 1898 revenues stamps through their financial operations in New York, while Gould controlled railroads would use a major share of battleships on waybills and checks throughout the southwestern United States.


Wednesday, October 31, 2012

Chicago Board of Trade Members: Barrett, Farnum & Company


BARRETT, FARNUM & CO.
XXX
XXX

Langlois scans

By December 1900, the list of CBOT members included many Barretts and a Farnum, but also a Barrett, Farnum firm.  It appears the the firm's failure in September 1899 was permanent.  See the NYT article below.



B. F. & Co.
JUL  27  1898

These cancels are from a CBOT lot.  I would like to confirm that they belong to Barrett, Farnum & Company or to Bartlett, Frazier & Company, both CBOT firms in 1898.  If you have an on-document example that can provide the confirmation, please write 1898revenues@gmail.com

*****


The risks in trading in futures is partly reflected in the article below:

From The New York Times, September 22, 1899:

WHEAT PLUNGE CAUSES FAILURE

Influential Firm of Barrett, Farnum & Co. Forced to Suspend.

BEARS DRIVEN TO COVER.

Wall Street Business Lighter and Quieter--The Wheat Flurry--Live Stock Markets Weak.

Chicago, Sept. 21.--The firm of Barrett, Farnum & Co., a wealthy and influential board of trade concern here, failed today. 

The firm had sold heavily short during the past three days, plunging in the expectation that the New York stock panic would result in a break in wheat.  The shortage of the firm is variously estimated at from four to five million bushels of the December option.

It was noticed yesterday that Barrett, Farnum & Company were heavy buyers--the heaviest in the local pit, taking in about a million in an effort to cover.  The price held firm with a strength that puzzled the theorists in vew of the bearish tone of the news.  Again this morning the brokers representing the firm were busy in the pit, but all efforts proved of no avail.

The crash came at 11 o'clock, when the deals went into the clearing house.  Barrett, Farnum & Company in a hastily scrawled notice announced the inability of the firm to fulfill its contracts.  Then the scene took on the tone of a panic...

Meanwhile, Mssrs. Barrett, Farnum & Company had closed their doors.  James Walker, manager of the concern, when seen, declared that he was as much surprised as any one at the suspension, and gave as his opinion that the firm would be able to resume business inasmuch as the subsiding of the panic had left wheat fluctuating narrowly.





Sunday, October 28, 2012

On Beyond Holcombe: Andreas Saxlehner's Hunyadi Janos Natural Mineral Water

On Beyond Holcombe, by Malcolm A. Goldstein, appears on Sundays at 1898 Revenues.  This edition, on Hunyadi Janos Mineral Water, wades into a pool, as it were, of speculative attribution, for which Malcolm provides a prologue below.  Due to technical problems beyond this editor's control, images are limited for this post.  More may be added later.




The Philatelic Quandary of the “A.S.” Cancel

Andreas Saxlehner and his Hunyadi Janos Bitterquelle/Hunyadi Janos Natural Mineral Water, have never drawn much philatelic attention since the one “A.S.” cancel listed by Mustacich and Giacomelli is not printed, but handstamped, and, at best, tentatively linked to Andreas Saxlehner because of an old attribution by Morton Dean Joyce. His identifications have certainly been questioned and even in some cases apparently disproved. Moreover, “A.S.” cancels have been observed only on a minimal number of 1c and 2c proprietary stamps, values more traditionally used for taxing alcohol products. While Schedule B of the Revenue Act of 1898 included “waters” claiming medicinal properties among taxable proprietary medicines, that specific inclusion was followed by: “ except for natural spring waters and carbonated natural spring waters.” Since the paper label attached to the bottles of the Saxlehner company denominated its product “natural mineral water,” why would it have bothered to stamp its bottles, collect and pay the tax, and, if it did, where are all the stamps?

While this query poses a most vexing question, there are some possible explanations. The first, and most facile, is that the company conducted some a side-line business in a more traditionally taxable alcohol based product, and cancelled stamps for that purpose. That explanation protects both the clear import of the Act and accounts for the relatively few, pesky observed cancels on non-traditional values, but does require a McGuffin in the form of another undisclosed (and so far undiscovered) Saxlehner product. While Saxlehner also did manufacture pills at some point, the time frame was probably not in 1898, and pills do not fit the 1c, 2c mold either. Another, admittedly more circuitous, possible explanation arises from discussion of Hunyadi Janos containers in bottle collection circles, where they are fairly common and their attributes have often been discussed. There, as well informed bottle websites have noted, Saxlehner’s water is often mistakenly classified as a “bitters” because the name “Hunyadi Janos Bitterquelle” is pressed into the glass forming the bottom of the bottle. A “bitters” is a solution of ingredients dissolved in alcohol. Bitters were explicitly taxable under the Revenue Act of 1898. Might it not have been possible that Hunyadi Janos Bitterquelle was regarded either in some places, or at some time, as a bitters, even if only temporarily? (At the risk of prematurely revealing the punch line of a very different story,) certainly, the Coca Cola company stamped, collected and paid tax under the Revenue Act of 1898 only to sue and recover it back from the government later. (This series will eventually tackle that well documented company, as well, although that story has already been told in several places.) Of course, the better-safe-than-sorry explanation would require either a battleship stamped Bitterquelle bottle or a record of some tax recovery proceeding brought by the Saxlehner Company against the U.S. government, neither of which appears to exist. Of course, the simplest, most straight forward and least interesting solution would be to concede that the A.S. cancels belong to an unidentified alcohol distributor.

Having thus stated the paradox, I choose to commit philatelic heresy and accept the attribution of the “A.S.” cancels to Andreas Saxlehner for the sake of profiling an interesting nostrum company.







“Hunyadi Janos.” During his
lifetime his name was synonymous
with deeds of valor on the field
of battle and destruction of human
life; today it is synonymous with
preservation of health and life.

Pacific Medical Journal, March, 1898


Andreas Saxlehner, whose Hunyadi Janos Natural Mineral Water occupied a significant niche in the market of United States nostrums at the time of the Spanish-American War, probably never even visited this country and, because he seems to have lived and died in Hungary, may not have ever considered America significantly in his thinking. While the company participated as a member of the powerful Proprietary Association of America and the market for Hunyadi Janos Water was booming in the United States in 1898 - the very year the company issued a 129 page manifesto, from which the introduction above is quoted - Saxlehner was not even alive by that time. He was born in Pest in 1815 and died in the unified city of Budapest in 1889. Yet the business, after 1889 owned by his wife, Emilie, and managed by his son, Kalman, was always conducted in his name. Extant immigration records indicate that Kalman visited the United States at least in 1897 and 1905.

The name Hunyadi Janos and the stern countenance of the product’s logo derived from the great Hungarian warrior John Hunyadi (1407-56) renowned for driving the Turks out of the Balkans in his time, and lifting a Turkish siege of Belgrade shortly before his untimely death from plague. The water itself came from the Buda district of Budapest, about five miles from the town itself. As the company’s tract explained, although Buda had been known as a site for medicinal springs and baths even in Roman times, it was Saxlehner himself who bought the spring and the surrounding land in 1863 from the peasant who discovered the water’s healing properties.





In 1898, the company could justly crow “Hunyadi Janos water has been a household word wherever the sun of civilization shines, for more than a quarter of a century.” Saxlehner shrewdly gathered the 120 acres of the Orsod valley surrounding the spring as a compound to preserve its purity and boasted that: “The greatest care is taken in collecting and bottling the water, the whole process being carried out entirely by machinery, and every possible source of contamination is most scrupulously guarded against. “ The collection plant, gathering water from the 112 wells comprising the spring, was manned by approximately 250 employees, who, along with storehouses for the water, had cottages and a fire station right on the estate premises. Before turning to a very long recitation of the encomiums the water had received from eminent scientists and other leaders of society, the book carefully analyzed the geological formations which accounted for the springs and, in minute detail, the mineral components of the water and each of their healing properties, as well as providing a discussion of the benefits the water brought to the treatment of disorders such as constipation (first and foremost), “torpidity of the liver,” dyspepsia, hemorrhoids, obesity, specific diseases of women and children, various diseases of the heart and circulation, the respiratory organs, the brain and spinal chord, eyes, urinary tract, fevers, gout, rheumatism, as well as mental diseases, which the book defined essentially as constipation of the character best regulated with a purgative: “Faecal [sic] accumulation not infrequently causes delusions, which are dispelled by a purgative that clears out the intestinal canal. In all forms of disease of the mind regulation of the bowels is an important part of the treatment.” So much for Freud and his ilk!

The Hunyadi Janos name was so much a part of the marketing of Saxlehner’s water that the company fought titanic struggles in the courts of both England and the United States to protect its exclusive rights particularly to the Hunyadi portion of the name. Saxlehner had first sold his Hunyadi Janos water in England in 1870, but in 1876 had entered into a ten year contract with the Apollinaris Co. Ltd., an English importer and dealer in mineral waters of various kinds, granting that company the right to represent itself as the sole distributor of his water almost anywhere in the world except Europe and Smryna, Turkey. The arrangement was successful enough to be continued and renewed. However, in 1888, Apollinaris began to add an additional red diamond label to the Hunyadi Janos label for purposes of denominating the water an Apollinaris mineral water product, apparently without informing Saxlehner. At the same time, Apollinaris also purchased land in Buda which, coincidently, also contained mineral water springs. In 1896, after Apollinaris cancelled its distributorship contract with Saxlehner, it immediately began marketing in England its own “Arpenta” water, bottled at the “Uj [New] Hunyadi” springs in Budapest , which bore a label similar to the Hunyadi Janos label and mentioned Hunyadi prominently several times. It also transferred over to the Arpenta label the additional Apollinaris red label.

Emilie Saxlehner then sued in the English courts to bar Apollinaris from selling any water not from her springs as “Hunyadi” water, claiming that her water had become commonly or popularly identified with the name “Hunyadi” water, and further asserting the steps Apollinaris had taken since 1888 indicated its deliberate effort to trade on Saxlehner’s “Hunyadi Janos” name. Apollinaris’s defense turned on two points. First, as Saxlehner’s distributor for so long, the red diamond it had established as its identity and then transferred to the Arpenta label belonged to it not Saxlehner. If people paid more attention to the red diamond than the Saxlehner label that was Saxlehner’s problem, but not a problem the court could fix. Second, Saxlehner had no exclusive right to the “Hunyadi” term, since Hunyadi was regarded as a Hungarian regional designation and its use of the term on its own Arpenta water was proper because its water came from the same geographic area. Quickly cutting to the heart of the matter, the Court ruled in favor of Saxlehner. In its one long paragraph decision, it found that regardless of the circumstances which created the situation, the simple governing legal principle was that: “Nobody has the right to represent his goods as the goods of someone else.” To the English court, that legal certainty sufficiently covered all the legal ground necessary to uphold Saxlehner’s rights. However, it carefully circumscribed the relief it granted: it gave Saxlehner the exclusive right to use the “Hunyadi” name (which it felt`sufficiently protected Saxlehner’s rights), and granted an accounting for lost sales damages, but it did not enjoin Apollinaris’s switch of its subsidiary red diamond label to its own new water, relying upon level headed English consumers to recognize the difference between Apollinaris’s own mark on the revised Arpenta label and the absent Saxlehner “Hunyadi” mark.

In the United States, Emilie Saxlehner took her fight to protect the Hunyadi Janos name all the way to the Supreme Court. Saxlehner’s opponent in the United States was an importer named Eisner & Mendelson (another company which also cancelled battleship revenues and will be visited by this series in due course). When the case arrived at the Supreme Court, that Court noted the same basic facts as in the British case, although recognizing, much more pointedly than the English court, that the contract between Saxlehner and Apollinaris had included the United States as part of the distributorship territory granted to Apollinaris. E & M argued its right to sell a Hunyadi Matyas water, which both came in a bottle and bore a label suspiciously similar to that of the Hunyadi Janos water, derived from a separate grant made in Hungary to another producer of mineral water. In addition - in what must have been a claim particularly galling to Saxlehner - E & M argued that Apollinaris, as Saxlehner’s agent in the United States, had known about and approved E & M’s use of the Hunyadi Matyas name. The Court set out both these arguments at length, reviewing in detail the histories both of convoluted Hungarian grants of licenses to bottle mineral water, together with that of mineral water designations in the United States. Essentially accepting E & M’s explanations, it found both that Hunyadi was a regional designation from which more than one mineral water could emerge, and that Saxlehner had not been vigilant enough in challenging the use of the name “Hunyadi” by others in the United States.

Yet, the Court still ruled in Saxlehner’s favor, ultimately holding that E & M had deliberately manipulated both the bottle shape and the label of its water - apart from its invocation of the Hunyadi name - in a deliberate attempt to mislead and deceive. It too awarded damages for lost sales, and, again, exempted from the ban, as did the English Court, only a special additional label that E & M, like Apollinaris, had affixed to the bottle to identify the product as its own import, reasoning as did the English, that consumers could distinguish between the importer and the bottler once the label confusion itself was resolved. In this manner, two different courts approached the same question by two different routes, one circuitous and one direct, and reached the same conclusion. While neither court relied on a specific written law for its ruling, the sense of both opinions is that the courts should stop unfair competition, and, as Justice Potter Stewart said a hundred years later about pornography, the courts “know it when they see it.” The kind of legal reasoning that both courts implicitly applied is one that permits the courts to address the totality of the circumstances of an entire situation - using so-called “supplemental jurisdiction” - to decide a clutch of different possible legal claims that arise out of a single set of facts. In the United States, Saxlehner immediately issued an industry-wide warning to all retailers to stop selling E & M’s water. The Philadelphia branch of the retail drug industry had to make a special plea to the Saxlehner company to refrain from threatening suit against local drug stores, but once the label changes were made, the courts had no further trouble allowing the Arpenta water to be sold in competition to the Hunyadi Janos, and further legal efforts by Saxlehner to disrupt its sales were denied.

In the 1900s, the Andreas Saxlehner office in the United States continued to prosper, apparently managed by one Charles Edward Ensko. In 1913, the company even addressed a letter to the Ways and Means Committee of the United States House of Representatives, expressing its view that mineral water should be exempted from import duties. However, during World War I, the company was seized by the U S government and confiscated under the Trading With The Enemy Act as an importing business operating at 130 Fulton Street in New York City and still owned by Emilie, a Hungarian citizen, and, as such, a enemy national. This wartime legislation authorized the U S government to confiscate all money, stock and property in the United States owned by enemy nationals. The government transferred seized assets to an Alien Property Custodian (at that time, U S Attorney General Mitchell A. Palmer), who had the war time power to administer it in the manner best suited to advance the war effort, including conserving it, licensing it or even selling it at public auction to American interests. To raise money for the government, Saxlehner’s company was sold at auction in 1921 and ultimately transferred to a new Hunyadi Janos Corporation, which then resumed advertising and sales of Hunyadi Janos water.

All seemed well until April, 1922 when a man named Alexander F Stoeger, whose principal business appears to have been guns and firearms, advertised to the pharmacy trade that he had just completed a contract with the Saxlehner family in Hungary to import and distribute the real Hunyadi Janos water from the original spring in Hungary. (On the same trip to Europe, Stoeger apparently had also negotiated a license to sell Luger pistols in the United States.) Now there were to be Hunyadi Janos products distributed by the American company, and the imported Hungarian Hunyadi Janos water distributed by Stoeger. Who actually owned the rights to call its water Hunyadi Janos water?

Curiously, a question very similar in legal consequences to this one had been litigated years before in 1886 in a case also involving Saxlehner arising from somewhat different factual circumstances. In the earlier case, Apollinaris, as Saxlehner’s American distributor, had clearly marked its bottles of Hunyadi Janos water as being legitimately for sale only within Apollinaris’s sales territory. Another importer, Scherer, purchased legitimate Hunyadi Janos water from Saxlehner’s European distributor, imported it to the United States without Apollinaris’s restricted marking, and then undersold Apollinaris in the United States. Apollinaris sued for trademark infringement. The court denied the injunction on the grounds that the trademark on the other importer’s Hunyadi Janos water was perfectly legitimate, so their could be no infringement of trademark, thus holding that the trademark protected the genuineness of the underlying product, not the distributor’s exclusive contractual right to sell in the territory assigned to it by the producer. It cautioned that if the other water had been some other kind falsely labeled instead of genuine Hunyadi Janos water, the injunction would have been granted. Even by 1922, scholars and some other courts had challenged the legal reasoning of that decision as not going far enough to protect the legitimate distributor’s right to its territory.

In 1922, The new American Hunyadi Janos company, now possessor of the underlying trademarks, immediately sued Stoeger, claiming precedence for its water by way of its purchase of the Saxlehner Hunyadi Janos trademark from the Alien Property Custodian, and stating that the 1921 purchase had established a territorial boundary against encroachment by a later trademark user, no matter how legitimate the second usage might claim to be. Stoeger, using one of Saxlehner’s attorneys from the E & M dispute twenty years earlier, defended on two grounds: first, that the trademark actually was part of the Saxlehner’s Hungarian water well property, not the New York business, and thus had never properly been seized by the Alien Property Custodian; second, on the grounds raised in the 1886 case, that since the water he was selling was the real Saxlehner product, there certainly could not be a violation of the registered trademark rights. Stoeger won the preliminary court skirmishes in 1922 largely on the strength of the 1886 ruling. The court permitted him to sell the Hungarian water as genuine Hunyadi Janos water. Given clear sailing by the federal court, he pressed his advantage, advertising widely that the federal court had blessed his distributorship.

In 1923, the Supreme Court took up the issue of whether trademarks only guaranteed genuineness of the product or protected the distributor’s territorial rights to exclusive use as well, and changed the law by extending the ambit of trademark protection to protect the distributor’s exclusive right to use within its territory. In 1925, when the lawsuit between the American Hunyadi Janos Corporation and Stoeger finally was tried, the trial court had no difficulty following the 1923 Supreme Court ruling. Yet, when the federal appellate court reviewed that trial record and sorted the legal issues through completely, it reversed the trial court and again supported Stoeger’s claim. This court approached the matter quite differently than the Supreme Court had either the E & M case or the 1923 case. First, the appellate court took an extremely narrow approach to its power to determine the dispute. It ruled that since both parties lived in the same state, only the state court had the proper authority to hear all claims of unfair competition or rights to images acquired by use. Instead of invoking, either implicitly or explicitly, its “supplemental jurisdiction” to examine all of the commonalities of the appearance of the two products and the entire set of circumstances surrounding the two differing claims, it held that the federal court only could rule on that claim which pertained to the trademarks directly registered with the federal government. By avoiding the very issue of unfair similarities in shape and look that the Supreme Court had earlier determined to be critical in the E & M case, the federal court narrowly circumscribed its legal examination to the issue of whether the Alien Property Custodian had, in fact, properly seized the registered Saxlehner trademarks.

To accomplish this inquiry, the court then recounted the history of the trademark registrations. It found that Andreas Saxlehner had originally filed two trademarks in 1887 patterned on the same logo design, the difference being that one specifically protected the term “Hunyadi” and the logo, and the other protected the term “Janos” and the logo. The court then ruled that the decision in the E & M case had effectively cancelled any protection under the “Hunyadi” trademark, and, further, that since the current record did not identify the owner of the 1887 “Janos” trademark as an alien, it could not determine ownership of that trademark. However, the court noted, more significantly, the Saxlehner family had made two later registrations of Hunyadi Janos trademarks in 1909. These trademarks, it concluded, were “appurtenant to” the Hungarian wells themselves and thus owned by the Saxlehners personally, not the business office in New York located at 130 Fulton Street. Reasoning from that conclusion, the court held that the Alien Property Custodian had never properly attached or seized them. Because the Alien Property Custodian had not seized them, the Custodian could not sell them as part of the 1921 auction of the Andreas Saxlehner Hunyadi Janos business located at 130 Fulton Street. The American company was entitled to no protection under trademarks it had never owned. In other words, although the court did not use this coarse expression, it ruled: “no tickee, no washee.”

A large moral can be adduced from thoughtful consideration of this last court opinion. While the decision appears wrong intuitively, most federal courts in most ages have actively inclined to narrow the scope of their judicial intrusion into normal commerce and the lives of American citizens, a position that is often articulated today as “strict construction,” and such a view always must be considered and analyzed most carefully, in light of the peculiar practical consequences which follow from it, as in this case. Too often the forest can be missed while one is busy staring at the trees. This is the modern moral the reader should carry away from this absurdly extended treatise on mineral water long ago evaporated by time.

However, a more twisted, conspiratorial theory for this decision - even if more banal and pedestrian in its motivation - can also be elicited, and so, in the interests of full disclosure, must be reported. Records, available today even on line, show that the Alien Property Custodian, in its report for the year 1919, clearly lists the 1909 Hunyadi Janos trademarks as part of the property of the Andreas Saxlehner firm the Alien Property Custodian had seized and now considered within its control. The 1921 sale most definitely included those 1909 trademarks, so the American company’s claim should have had precedence over Stoeger’s.

In the plane of legal reasoning, the second theoretical question, left unexamined by the appellate court, of whether the new company with proper ownership of the trademarks could have barred the original company through its new distributor from selling the same product should have been resolved by the Supreme Court’s 1923 decision. That court should have barred the new distributor from selling the original company’s water. While that ruling might have led to the further difficulty of where the new American Hunyadi Janos Company would have obtained its future supply of genuine Hunyadi Janos water (since Saxlehner, after 1922, was dealing with Stoeger), the court could have left the market to resolve that difficulty: reasoning that if Stoeger were barred from selling the Hunyadi Janos water, Saxlehner would either have to return to supplying its product to the American Hunyadi Janos Company that owned its U S trademarks, or risk not having any representative in the United States market selling Hunyadi Janos water. The trial court was prepared to permit this result.

By completely ignoring, discounting or nullifying the seizure of the 1909 trademarks, the appellate court rendered that issue merely hypothetical, and what stands out about the 1925 decision is the error the court permitted to stand concerning the seizure of the 1909 trademarks. The appellate court attached no credence, and certainly no legal significance, to the 1919 report of the Alien Property Custodian that specifically listed the 1909 trademarks among the seized property. How could the court overlook that fact? What purpose did the Alien Property Custodian serve, if not to seize the “business” of foreign nationals? How could the trademark remain in Hungary with the wells, and not represent the “good will” associated with the trademark image that the American company had clearly purchased? If not the exclusive right to use the image, what did the 1909 trademark stand for?

Normally the litigants themselves must be blamed when courts draw improper impressions of the facts. The conspiratorial twist enters the plot here. Judge Martin T. Manton, one of the three judges responsible for the appellate court opinion (although not the judge who signed it) was subsequently stripped of his office, convicted of selling his court vote for money and sentenced to prison, some fourteen years after this decision, in 1939. While the Depression, which began in 1929, is blamed for Manton’s terrible plight and downfall, it is possible to speculate that maybe there was hanky panky going on even at this early date! While this explanation is extremely fanciful and far fetched, just as Barry Bonds, Mark McGuire and Sammy Sosa draw asterisks in the home run record books, an asterisk might well be applied to this 1925 court decision. All decisions in which Judge Manton played some role still draw extra scrutiny, even almost ninety years later. Conspiracies can exist where ever one chooses to look for, and find, them.

Sadly, for all the hoopla surrounding the various court decisions, little more is recorded about the ultimate fate of the dueling companies in New York City, their products and their distributorship businesses in the United States. While the Hungarian Saxlehner company was still advertising its water in Australia in 1928 and registering Hunyadi Janos trademarks in the United States in 1931, the record is silent about the ultimate fate of the Hunyadi Janos brand. Perhaps the contending distributors succumbed to the effects of the Depression. There are no buildings, as some other companies left, to memorialize their passing, and mentions of the water, the pills and all of the contending companies in advertising and public documents just ceases in the 1930s. Stoeger’s arms business continued well into the 1950s. The Saxlehners continued to live in Budapest until 1938, just after Emilie’s death, when growing European unrest compelled them to flee from Hungary to the United States. There is left only one last philatelic quirk: Andreas Saxlehner’s mansion in Budapest now serves as the Hungarian Postal Museum.